Intoxication does not excuse wrongdoing; it aggravates it. In fact, it is better described as an anti-defence than a defence.’
Introduction
The United Kingdom is widely known for its social culture, particularly its pub culture. In most towns and cities across the UK, Friday and Saturday nights are big business for pubs, hosting residents and visitors for social gatherings and drinks. Unfortunately, for some, having one drink too many can transform a friendly, fun-loving person into the complete opposite, often leading to violence or other criminal activity.
The UK’s legal system does not permit a person to commit a crime while voluntarily intoxicated. However, intoxication may be raised as a defence in certain circumstances. This essay will examine when intoxication can and cannot be used as a defence in the criminal justice system and evaluate the fairness of its application.
The General Principles of Intoxication as a Defence
If an individual voluntarily consumes alcohol or drugs and commits a crime, they remain legally responsible for their actions. The leading case is DPP v Majewski [1977], where the defendant consumed a large quantity of alcohol and drugs before engaging in a violent rampage, assaulting police officers and members of the public. He argued that his intoxicated state prevented him from forming the necessary mens rea for the offences.
The House of Lords rejected this argument, holding that voluntary intoxication is not a defence to crimes of basic intent because becoming intoxicated is itself a reckless course of action. This case established the principle that self-induced intoxication cannot negate recklessness, ensuring that individuals remain criminally responsible for their actions, even if they were drunk or high at the time.
Judicial Reasoning in Majewski
Lord Elwyn-Jones LC:
"If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to lose control of his faculties, he must be held to have intended the consequences which follow."Lord Simon of Glaisdale:
"A person who deliberately takes alcohol or drugs takes the risk of what may follow. It is not unjust that he should be held liable for the consequences of his own voluntary acts."Lord Russell of Killowen:
"Self-induced intoxication, however gross, is no defence to a crime of basic intent. The law cannot allow a man to excuse himself by pleading that he was too drunk to control himself."
Evaluation and Analysis of the General Principles
In Majewski, the outcome of the case appears just—one should not be able to rely on intoxication as a defence for criminal actions, particularly when those actions are violent or repugnant. However, applying this rigid standard to all cases seems overly broad, as it fails to account for the varying degrees of culpability among offenders. It does not allow for consideration of individual circumstances and offers no flexibility for those who, unlike Majewski, commit less serious offences while intoxicated.
Moreover, most people have likely witnessed a friend, family member, or even a stranger behaving foolishly while intoxicated. In some instances, such behaviour could technically constitute a criminal offence, despite no malicious intent. Under Majewski, these individuals could face criminal liability simply for being intoxicated, even where the act was spontaneous, minor, or non-violent. While the principle of recklessness justifies liability in serious cases, its automatic application to all intoxicated offenders raises concerns—should recklessness always be assumed, regardless of the circumstances?
What About Involuntary Intoxication?
There are instances where courts have taken a more sympathetic approach when a defendant’s intoxicated state was not voluntarily induced. The leading case on involuntary intoxication is R v Hardie [1985]. The defendant, Hardie, was depressed after breaking up with his partner. To calm himself, he took some Valium (a prescription sedative) that had been given to him by his ex-girlfriend. Unlike alcohol or illegal drugs, Valium is generally intended to have a calming effect. However, instead of making him drowsy, the drug had an unexpected effect—it caused Hardie to become aggressive and reckless. Under the influence of the drug, he set fire to a wardrobe in his ex-girlfriend’s flat, causing damage.
Hardie was charged with criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. He argued that he was not reckless because he had no reason to believe the Valium would make him behave dangerously. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction, ruling that if a person takes a drug they reasonably believe to have a calming effect, but it unexpectedly causes aggression or recklessness, they may be able to use involuntary intoxication as a defence.
Unlike alcohol or illegal drugs (which are known to impair judgment), Valium is a sedative, so Hardie was not reckless in taking it. Since he had no reason to expect the Valium to make him behave aggressively, his intoxication was not legally voluntary.
Judicial Reasoning in Hardie
Lord Lane CJ (on voluntary vs involuntary intoxication):
"If the effect of a drug is to calm and sedate, and it has been taken for that purpose, then it cannot be right to say that the taking of that drug is itself reckless."On why Hardie’s case was different from typical intoxication cases:
"The appellant took the tablets in the belief that they would have a sedative effect. In those circumstances, he was entitled to argue that his intoxication was not self-induced in the way that the taking of alcohol or dangerous drugs would be."On whether Hardie was reckless in taking Valium:
"It was not proved that the appellant either knew or ought to have known that the Valium would render him aggressive or liable to behave in an unpredictable or dangerous manner."
Evaluation and Analysis of Involuntary Intoxication
The decision in Hardie suggests that if an individual takes a drug—without a medical prescription—and experiences an unexpected adverse reaction, they may still be able to rely on involuntary intoxication as a defence. This raises important concerns about inconsistencies between Hardie and Majewski.
In Majewski, intoxication was categorically rejected as a defence, even though the defendant may not have foreseen his exact reaction. Yet, in Hardie, the defendant was able to use intoxication as a defence, despite taking an unprescribed Class C drug, which carries legal penalties for possession.
This apparent contradiction raises a critical issue—should an individual’s lack of knowledge about a drug’s effects excuse reckless behaviour, while voluntary intoxication automatically leads to liability? The disparity between these rulings suggests that the law treats different forms of intoxication with inconsistent levels of culpability, leading to potential unfairness in its application.
However, it is important to distinguish Hardie from cases of spiking. In Hardie, the defendant voluntarily took a drug that was given to him by his ex-girlfriend, believing it would have a calming effect. This case does not address the growing concern of spiking, where an individual is unknowingly drugged by another party. The legal principle in Hardie is correctly applied, ensuring that a victim of spiking who subsequently commits a criminal offence may not be held liable, as they were not of sound mind due to the involuntary administration of drugs.
Are All Crimes Equal in Intoxication?
So far, we have discussed basic intent crimes such as assault, battery, and criminal damage. However, some offences require the defendant to have a specific intention beyond mere recklessness. In such cases, voluntary intoxication may be a defence if it prevents the formation of intent. These offences are known as "specific intent crimes."
The key case on voluntary intoxication and specific intent is R v Sheehan & Moore [1975]. The defendants, Sheehan and Moore, were highly intoxicated when they poured petrol over a homeless man and set him on fire, causing his death. They were charged with murder.
During the trial, they argued that due to their extreme intoxication, they were incapable of forming the necessary intent (mens rea) for murder. The key question was whether their intoxication negated their ability to form the specific intent required for murder.
The Court of Appeal ruled that voluntary intoxication can be a defence to specific intent crimes if the defendant was too intoxicated to form intent. However, the court reduced their conviction from murder to manslaughter, applying the principle that intoxication does not excuse reckless behaviour, as later confirmed in Majewski.
Judicial Reasoning in Sheehan & Moore
The Court of Appeal in R v Sheehan & Moore [1975] 1 WLR 739 was presided over by Lawton LJ, sitting with Bridge and Croom-Johnson JJ.
On the principle that intoxication may negate specific intent:
"A defendant who is too intoxicated to form the specific intent required for a particular offence cannot be convicted of that offence."
On the distinction between specific and basic intent crimes:
"Where a crime requires proof of specific intent, the prosecution must show that the defendant possessed the necessary mens rea, regardless of intoxication."
On why murder was reduced to manslaughter:
"If intoxication prevents a defendant from forming the necessary intent for murder, a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter may be appropriate instead."
On voluntary intoxication generally:
"A drunken intent is still an intent."
Evaluation and Analysis of Specific Intent Crimes
The case of Sheehan & Moore is deeply troubling, as it demonstrates a significant legal gap—where extreme intoxication can, in effect, lower the severity of a charge from murder to manslaughter.
This ruling raises concerns that the law permits individuals to escape full liability for unlawful killings simply because they were intoxicated. The rigidity of the definition of murder, requiring specific intent, has in this instance failed to deliver full justice for the victim.
While the defendants were still held accountable for the killing, their conviction for manslaughter rather than murder creates an unsettling precedent. The law, in its attempt to be consistent, appears overly lenient in cases where intoxication is self-induced.
This contrasts sharply with the approach taken in Majewski, where intoxication is no defence for basic intent crimes. Allowing intoxication to negate intent in specific intent crimes results in an unjust disparity—where reckless violence under the influence can be treated with lesser consequences than sober but reckless behaviour.
Theoretical Perspectives on Criminal Liability and Intoxication
The legal treatment of intoxication as a defence raises fundamental questions about criminal responsibility and justice, which can be examined through two key theoretical perspectives: Utilitarianism vs. Retributivism and Autonomy & Responsibility.
A utilitarian approach focuses on deterrence and societal protection. From this perspective, allowing intoxication as a defence too broadly could undermine the law’s ability to deter individuals from reckless behaviour. The strict rule in Majewski, which holds voluntarily intoxicated individuals liable for basic intent crimes, aligns with this principle—people should be discouraged from excessive drinking or drug use if it might lead to criminal conduct.
By contrast, a retributivist approach is concerned with moral blameworthiness—punishment should be based on an individual's guilty mind (mens rea) at the time of the offence. If a person is so intoxicated that they genuinely lack criminal intent, should they be held fully responsible? This perspective raises concerns about fairness in Majewski, as it assumes recklessness for all voluntarily intoxicated offenders, even in cases where their actions may not have been entirely foreseeable. The decision in Sheehan & Moore, which allows intoxication to negate specific intent, is more aligned with retributivist principles, as it ensures that only those who intended to commit a crime are convicted of the most serious offences.
The question of autonomy and responsibility is also crucial. Criminal law generally assumes individuals act rationally and are responsible for their choices. But if intoxication removes a person's ability to form intent, should they still be held accountable? The inconsistency between Majewski (which enforces liability even when intent is absent) and Hardie (which provides a defence if intoxication was involuntary) suggests that the law struggles to balance individual responsibility with fairness. If intoxicated individuals lack rational decision-making ability, should liability differ depending on whether intoxication was voluntary or involuntary?
Ultimately, the law attempts to strike a compromise between deterrence and blameworthiness, but the inconsistencies between cases suggest an uneven application of these principles. A more coherent legal framework would require a clearer justification for when intoxication should excuse liability and when it should not.
Conclusion
The law on intoxication as a defence presents inconsistencies and contradictions that raise fundamental questions about culpability, fairness, and justice. While Majewski ensures that individuals remain responsible for basic intent crimes, Sheehan & Moore allows intoxication to negate intent in specific intent crimes, potentially leading to reduced liability in serious offences such as murder. Hardie further complicates the legal landscape by permitting a defence for involuntary intoxication, even where the defendant took a controlled substance without a prescription.
These cases demonstrate that the legal principles governing intoxication lack coherence. In some instances, voluntary intoxication results in automatic liability, while in others, it reduces or eliminates criminal responsibility altogether. This disparity is particularly troubling in cases like Sheehan & Moore, where extreme intoxication led to a brutal killing, yet the charge was downgraded to manslaughter.
While this essay has examined the key cases and principles, there are additional complexities in intoxication law, including the distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous drugs, the role of intoxication in crimes of negligence, and the difficulties in proving a defendant’s level of impairment. However, the core cases discussed represent the most significant legal issues.
Ultimately, intoxication law requires reform to ensure consistency and fairness. The courts should adopt a more unified approach that balances personal responsibility with genuine lack of intent, ensuring that recklessness remains a key factor in determining liability. Without such reform, intoxication will continue to operate as both a shield and a trap, allowing some defendants to escape justice while unfairly punishing others.